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INTRODUCING NEW TECHNOLOGIES INTO SPACE STATION SUBSYSTEMS

Cindy L Mollakarimi
Lockheed Space Operations Co.
Kennedy Space Center, FL

Michael J. Wiskerchen
Stanford University
Stanford, CA
I. Abstract

In a cooperative effort between Kennedy Space Center, Stanford University and
Lockheed Space Operations Company, a new systems engineering methodology has been
developed and applied in the operational world of Shuttle processing. The new engineering
approach stresses the importance of identifying, quantitatively assessing, and managing
system performance and risk related to the dynamic nature of requirements, technology,
and operational concepts. Under the cooperative program entitled, Space Systems
Integration and Operations Research Applications (SIORA), the modernization of the
processing operations for the Shuttle thermal protection system (IPS) or tiles became the
first application of the engineering methodology. This effort adopted an approach
consisting of an integrated set of rapid prototyping testbeds in which a government/
university/industry team of users, technologists, and engineers tested and evaluated new
concepts and technologies within and in parallel to Shuttle processing operations. The
integrated set of technologies introduced included speech recognition and synthesis
capabilities, laser imaging inspection systems, distributed Ada programming environ
ments, distributed relational database architectures, in addition to distributed computer
network architectures, multi-media workbenches, expert system applications, probabilistic
risk assessment modeling, and human factors considerations. The successful operational
implementation of the integrated prototype, referred to as the Space Shuttle Tile Automation
System, has validated the engineering methodology and strongly indicates that the same
approach would be a viable systems engineering and project management tool for Freedom
Space Station. This paper will address the lessons learned from the Shuttle processing
experience and will present concepts which are applicable to the design and development
of the Freedom Space Station.
II. Introduction
The technology base needed for the efficient and effective design, development and
operation of the Space Station is readily available today. Although true, a 1988
Congressional Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) report entitled, "Reducing Launch
Operations Costs: New Technologies and Practices", was critical of space-related systems
being operated and developed by the Department of Defense (DoD) and NASA. In recent
years, the traditional systems engineering and project management approaches utilized by
NASA and the DoD have failed to provide a means to incorporate rapidly evolving
technologies and operations concepts into system developments or system upgrades. The
development of an operationally efficient and productive Freedom Space Station, with its

6-29 .

long term utilization goals and rapidly changing technology environment, will severely test
traditional systems engineering approaches. This paper will address this issue and
describe a systems engineering methodology which will provide a means to accommodate
changing user needs, incorporate emerging technology, identify, quantify and manage
system risks, manage evolving functional requirements, track the changing environment
and reduce system life cycle costs.

UL^Backg round
Since the Second World War the science of system engineering has evolved to
where it now offers a demonstrated methodology for developing very complex, high
technology systems, This methodology involves the process of defining systems needs,,
developing performance requirements, evaluating alternatives for meeting these needs
and selecting the best available alternative, and then repeating the process at a more
detailed level until a cohesive, integrated set of traceable requirements have been
constructed. Detailed designs can then be formulated and implemented. System
engineering performs an oversight function to ensure system performance. The impetus
for the adoption of this engineering methodology in the aerospace industry has been the fact
that aerospace systems must work properly the first time and this engineering methodology
has been effective at ensuring this reliability.
This engineering approach was developed in the late 1950's and early 1960's forthe
development of the intercontinental ballistic missile (Thor, Atlas, etc). It was refined during
the development of the Polar is submarine launched ICBM. The civilian space program also
used this engineering approach on a number of programs ranging'from the first American
unmanned satellite launch of Explorer 1 in January 1958, to the landing of the first man on
the moon in July 1969, Each mission demonstrated the ability of the U.S. to perform very
complex aerospace activities that were remarkably successful,

Recently this same systems engineering approach has been used on a number of

environment tor the Freedom Space Station.
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that it was technology limited. Today it is difficult to recall the extent of the technological
challenge of the Apollo program. When President Kennedy challenged the nation to send
a man to the Moon in 1 961, the entire manned spacef light experience of the U.S. consisted
of 17 minutes of suborbital flight time. The key question was whether it was possible to build
the systems to meet these challenging goals, everything else was secondary. Another
factor this program exhibited was that it progressed very quickly. It was quite possible in
1961 to develop a satellite and launch it within 24 months or less. The Apollo program took
only 8 years even with the 18 months lost because of the Apollo 1 fire.
The Space Shuttle shared some of these elements in that the goal of reusability was
clear. It was also to be a vehicle that lowered the cost for access to space and increased
the availability of space for a variety of uses. In the area of reusability the Shuttle is a marvel
of technology, in the area of lowering cost and increasing availability it has not proved to be
so successful A vehicle that was originally designed to be turned around in two weeks and
flown for $ 10 million per flight, in actuality takes 12 weeks to turn around at a cost of $250
million. One reason is the specter of design to cost loomed large over this project. In
addition, this was the first time a major space project was dominated, both technically and
budgetarily, by long duration space and ground logistics and operations.
Today's high technology system development projects are typified by diverse goals,
resource limitations, large size, complex interfaces, long development schedules, and a
dynamically changing environment. Due to the increasing cost of todays systems in relation
to the overall budget it is increasingly important to build political coalitions in order to sell
programs. This leads to diverse system goals due to the diverse objectives of these
coalitions. The Shuttle development is a prime example. NASA needed Air Force support
and funding to be able to sell the program. The Air Force finally agreed but only if NASA
would modify Shuttle requirements so they would meet Air Force mission needs. This
increased the size of the cargo bay as well as the cross range on the Shuttle. Shuttle
payload weight requirements were also driven by Air Force polar payload needs. Design
to cost is increasingly used as technological capability increases. The question used to be
"what cam we do?"". The question today is "what can we afford?" Design to cost encourages
optimistic predictions of cost and schedule. Due to budget constraints NASA was forced
to abandon a fully reusable Shuttle because of development costs. Even though this vehicle
would have been safer and would have greatly reduced operational costs, the development
price tag forced the current Shuttle configuration.

The complexity of today's systems, particularly the Freedom Space Station, require
special techniques to ensure proper system level performance. The problem is not just that
there are more components in these advanced systems but that the interactions of these
components are far more complex and have a far greater impact on system performance
than in past systems,, A change in o^ne subsystem can have a disastrous impact on the
performance of another unrelated subsystem, which in turn can drastically reduce the
overall system performance. Understanding and documenting these interactions is
becoming increasing important as well as difficult, With the development of systems such
as the Space Station Freedom even higher levels of complexity are involved. In contrast.

the electrical interface between the Apollo command module and the Saturn 5 booster was
only 70 wires. Big is not always complex.
Today's long project development cycle presents problems. For a major aerospace
system the development cycle can stretch from 12 to 20 years or more. With the rapid
advance of technology this increasingly results in the development of systems that are
obsolete before they are operational. Overthis extended development period both the user
need and the system environment can change. Current systems are also being kept in
service longer than ever before. Operations, maintenance, and upgrade of systems over
an extended operational life (20-30 years) are an increasingly important consideration.
Operations cost of the system over its operational life may exceed the development cost by
an order of magnitude or more.
The key to the success of future system development projects, such as the Freedom
Space Station, lie in the ability to balance performance, cost, schedule and risk objectives
within a dynamically changing environment. The ability of these future projects to meet the
operational needs of a wide range of users with conflicting utilization requirements, while
remaining within budget and schedule constraints and allowing for future growth and
flexibility, will be the challenge. The key issues that need to be resolved are: what are the
key driving requirements for these future missions, what is the interaction between these
requirements, how do they change as a function of time and what are the risks? The normal
system engineering tools and methodologies have not been effective in answering these
crucial questions within the cost and schedule constraints. Without athorough understand
ing of these requirements, the accurate decomposition of the operational system architec
ture, both in space and on the ground, from major performance requirements and functions
down to the lower level component requirements, is impossible.
IV.

Requirements: Our Accumulated Ignorances

All systems engineering methodologies begin with mission requirements definition
and specification. Generally, there are three major players in this initial requirements
activity, the systems engineer, the system user (either in person or a surrogate), and the
technologist. Most projects use a linear phased approach (Concept Exploration Phase mission needs and objectives defined, Demonstration-Validation Phase - mission definition
and specification, Full Scale Development - detailed design, construction, assembly and
test, and the Operational Phase) to carry out the system engineering. Although there may
be involvement of all three major players in the Concept Exploration activities, the system
users and technologist have minimal involvement beyond this. Systems which use this
engineering methodology make the basic assumption that system needs and requirements
are fully understood and that the technology is identified during Concept Exploration and
will remain essentially static during the other phases. Figure 1 illustrates this linear
development cycle. The government procurement procedures are also structured in such
a way to formalize the assumption of static requirements, user needs and technology
throughout the life cycle of a project.
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Functional Phases for the Linear Engineering Process
Phase A

Phase B
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Phase D
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Define System
Goals and
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Operations
Phase
System
Deployment
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Verification

System
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Audit

System
Evolution

Operational
System ?

Operations
Concepts
Technology
Updates

Figure 1. Linear Engineering Cycle
The process moves efficiently along from engineering to design to development
whereby budget and schedule are managed carefully. System performance is judged
against the initial requirements. As the figure indicates, changing user needs or utilization
concepts, evolving technology, and operations cost modeling are not allowed to influence
the design or development of the system. If the system requirements are not well known
initially and/or the system technology or operations concepts are dynamically evolving, the
operational system will not be functionally adequate or cost effective.
Too often the linear approach neglects to define fully what the system is. Design
engineers generally believe that the system is the design and development of the hardware
while others may think that the primary objective is the functional operation of the hardware
for some purpose. This results in optimizing the design for the wrong functions. Optimizing
for development efficiencies instead of operational efficiencies can many times lead to
costly, unproductive, and unusable systems.
V. Systems Engineering for a Dynamic Development Environment
The Department of Defense and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA) has addressed the problems associated with a dynamic development environ
ment by initiating an industry-university-government program, called concurrent engineer
ing. The driving force behind the concurrent engineering methodology is the consideration
that requirements and technology will be evolving throughout the life of a project. This
requires the formulation of a engineering methodology which allows this dynamic evolution
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of requirements and technology to influence the system design, development and opera
tions. Figure 2 indicates the SIORA Project's concept of the concurrent engineering
process. The figure includes the engineering process through Demonstration/Validation.
The process begins with the formation of an engineering-users-technologists team to begin
preliminary system requirements definition from a best guess of user functional needs.
Membership of this team is derived equally from the university, industry and government
sectors. Each sector gains unique benefits from this working level interaction.
DYNAMIC SYSTEMS ENGINEERING (PHASE A & B)

User
Need Description
Ops Concept

Technologists
State of
the Art
Engineering
Tools
Methodology

Figure 2. Concurrent Engineering Process for Dynamic Systems
Concurrent engineering, as developed and practiced by the SIORA Project, has its
foundation rooted in identifying, quantitatively assessing, and managing system perform
ance and risk. This process starts with a performance model of the system that defines not
only the functions but the interrelationships between the functions. A detailed probabilistic
risk assessment (PRA) of the system elements and their inter-relationship is also per
formed. Risk analysis techniques include functional scenario scripts, system problem
studies, expert knowledge capture and consequence assessments. Risk probability
distributions are then derived forthe system in terms of performance attributes (e.g. money,
time, safety). These probability distributions are then formally applied to the choices-risk
management-decision theory process. This allows the systems engineer to derive a
maximum utility function (maximized for operational efficiency and productivity) based on
attribute priority. The formal process allows the systems engineer to evaluate design
alternatives and set priorities for resource (money, time, manpower) allocations. This
process will also identify those system requirements, elements or operations concepts
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which require additional work by the engineering-users-technologists team before they
become fixed system specifications.
At this point the team establishes a set of evaluation criteria for various proposed
concepts which were formulated to meet the preliminary requirements. The concepts which
have high risk values can take one of two paths. With either path, the primary objective of
the process is to validate the concepts in terms of satisfying the preliminary requirements
and to educate the team. Both work to reduce risk. Some concepts can be functionally
tested in a modeling or computer simulation environment while others must be placed in a
rapid prototyping testbed where "quick and dirty" point designs can be operated in a handson mode by the team. With both paths, rapid iteration is essential to the success of the
methodology. When several competing concepts satisfactorily meet the system require
ments, then a formal trade-off process must occur to arrive at the optimum concept.
Quantitative risk assessment techniques can be a useful tool for this formal trade-off
process. Before formal specification can begin, care must be taken to distill all design
specifications from the concepts such that vendor specific specifications from the point
designs are removed. It should be stated that not all requirements will be fully specified at
the end of Demonstration/Validation Phase in engineering design terms. Any Request for
Proposals (RFPs) for Full Scale Development should fully identify which requirements have
not been fully specified (those with high risk probabilities) and proceed with additional
prototyping to fill in any additional information that will be needed to complete the system
design. The present procurement system used by NASA must be totally restructured to
accommodate this dynamic nature of requirements, end user knowledge of system
functions and technology. The Freedom Space Station phase C/D procurements were
constrained by using the traditional linear engineering process for formation of the system
specifications.
The implementation of the dynamic system engineering methodology during the Full
Scale Development portion of a project is constrained and hampered by the considerable
cultural change which must occur for engineering personnel who are trained and are
experienced in the traditional linear systems engineering techniques. The primary problem
arises in dealing with evolving requirements, specifications and operations concepts.
Traditional linear systems engineering provides techniques to carefully manage and control
schedule and cost risks by ignoring or constraining the dynamic (time dependent) aspects
of the system. This process works well, in terms of career advancement, for engineering
managers whose system responsibilities end at the end of the development phase. Few
managers of Full Scale Development activities ever transition to become the managers of
the operational system, thus, inefficient and nonproductive operational systems have little
or no impact on the managers final success or failure. Under this management scheme,
design decisions will never be significantly influenced by whether a system is operationally
productive or cost effective. Any implementation of concurrent engineering during the Full
Scale Development period has to be accompanied by the understanding that managers will
have system performance and operational efficiency as two critical elements of the
managers performance evaluation. At present, Space Station has few or no incentives in
place to encourage and reward managers to incorporate design features which optimize
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operational efficiencies and productivity.
A key to good system engineering and management during the design-development
phase is the ability to keep the design process open to evolving requirements and
technology as long as practical. The fundamental tools to assist the systems engineer in
this process is the system performance model and quantitative (probabilistic) risk analysis.
The performance model will allow the impact of the changing requirements/environment to
be quantified and documented. This information is then input into the risk analysis. While
the risk analysis during the Concept Development Phase dealt with user ignorance of
needs/requirements, technology readiness, and system evolution, now the risk parameters
of time, budgets, and schedules must be assessed and managed. It should be stated again
that this risk analysis process is not a casual "seat of the pants" effort but one in which formal
quantitative probabilities are determined for each individual system element along with the
joint probabilities between elements. These quantitative assessments will provide an
exacting means to determine when further prototyping will reduce risks and when system
technology and specifications must be rigidly fixed for development. It will also provide a
quantitative means to determine where architectural "hooks and scars" (system hooks allow
for software evolution while scars allow for hardware evolution) must be designed into the
system such that evolution can, occur gracefully during the operational phase. In recent
years, NASA has incorporated this modular approach to spacecraft design so that on-orbit
maintenance, upgrading, and repair could be accomplished. In general, this has not ever
been a design concept for the overall operational (both ground and space segments)
system of any NASA program, The risk assessment analysis can provide a quantitative way
to evaluate which systems are susceptible to rapid technology evolution and utilization
concepts and could benefit from the introduction of architectural "hooks and scars'11 .
Several important hooks and scars techniques exist for communications and
information system elements for operational systems. These include standard! bus
architectures where functional applications are modularized on individual bus-compatible
plug-in units which can evolve with the technology, In the software area, the development
of software standards (i.e. UNIX, Ada, X-Window displays, etc.) and interface standards
and! protocols (i.e. ISO, IEEE:, etc.) provides the architectural hooks which permit easy
evolution during the operational phase of any program.
VL_..The.Qry. Meets.Reality — Space Shuttle Tile Automation Project
Although many of the concepts for the SIORA Project's, concurrent engineering
process were theoretically formulated by the early part: of 1986, the opportunity for a
practical appfcatton of the methodology did not appear until December, 1986, The Space
Systems Integration and Operations Research Applications (SIORA) Program was initiated
at that time as a cooperative applications research effort between Stanford University and
NASA Kennedy Space Center (KSC). One of the major initial SIORA tasks was the
appfcaHon' and introduction of automation and robotics technology to the most labor
intensive operation in the Space Shuttle program, the Shuttle thermal protection system
(tiles) processing and inspection. This effort adopted the concurrent engineering approach
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in which a government-university-industry team of operations personnel, technologists, and
engineers tested and evaluated new concepts and technologies within the operational
world of Shuttle. The integrated set of technologies introduced included speech recognition
and synthesis capabilities, laser imaging inspection systems, distributed Ada programming
environments, distributed relational database architectures, in addition to distributed
computer network architectures, multi-media workbenches, expert system applications,
probabilistic risk assessment modeling, and human factors considerations.
The labor intensiveness of the Shuttle Thermal Protection System (TPS) processing
can be traced back to the early design phase where only secondary consideration was given
to long term operations and maintenance issues. This has resulted in a TPS whose
maintenance program can be characterized as being labor intensive, antiquated and time
consuming. This is due to the fact that the maintenance program (based on initial
development phase specifications and procedures using linear engineering techniques)
uses manual techniques for inspection and measurement, mostly paper databases, no
networking between pertinent electronic databases, manual scheduling of operational
flows and a quality control and reliability program based on a paper information system.
An important part of the SIORA effort was to understand the organizational dynamics
involved in evolving the TPS operations from its present labor-intensive state to one in which
functionality and operational efficiency and productivity where primary drivers. Although
SIORA began as a systems engineering and technology transfer program, it was soon
realized that no implementation progress could be achieved without educating the opera
tions "culture" at the working level, the mid-level manager level and at the upper manage
ment level. The existing culture was composed of NASA and its prime operations
contractors with work functions ranging from engineering to quality assurance to technology
development.
Introducing new technologies and operational concepts into such a culture is
constrained by the lack of time available to interact with operations personnel. This is due
to the fact that TPS processing was so labor-intensive due to manual operations that the
work force had no time to think about or to attempt to improve the operational system by
themselves. Any technology transfer process must take this into account and provide an
efficient venue to expose operations personnel to the new concepts and technologies. A
hands-on prototyping environment, in parallel to the ongoing operational process, was
chosen as the vehicle to rapidly educate the operations personnel. Industry was invited to
participate as cost-sharing affiliates of Stanford so state-of-the-art, but commercially
available, technologies and technical experts could be made available to the prototyping
The participation of industry, in terms of personnel and equipment,
environment.
considerably reduced the risk involved in selecting appropriate technologies and integrating
them into a functional system.
Developing an understanding of the initial perceptions of the various organizations
was an important first step in the application of the engineering methodology. From a NASA
vantage point, this brought together three diverse organizational divisions, Shuttle Engi-

6-37

neering and Operations, Safety, Reliability, Maintainability & QA, and Advanced Technol
ogy. Each is driven by different goals and responsibilities and by different schedules and
budgets. Historically, Shuttle Engineering & Operations and SRM & QA have had a working
engineer - inspector relationship rather than a team attitude. The advanced technology
group has traditionally been considered "sand box types" where technologies are devel
oped that, although designed to address a perceived functional operational requirement,
have low probability of ever being implemented into the operational environment.
From the operations prime contractor (Lockheed Space Operations Company
(LSOC)) point of view, the project was initially looked at as an interesting concept with some
potential to give long term relief from the labor-intensive tile processing problems.
Historically, as part of the prime operations contract, contractors do not have contractual
authority to pursue studies for implementing new operations concepts or technology. In
addition, the present budgetary, man-power level and schedule climate (post-Challenger)
in the Shuttle processing environment made LSOC very conservative in its expectations for
the project. The initial response from LSOC was to dedicate several personnel to the project
which had considerable experience with Shuttle tile processing but were not part of the flow
schedule for Orbiter 103, Discovery.
Stanford University was also playing a historically non-traditional role. Stanford saw
the SIORA Project as a means to provide students and faculty with an applications
environment to test and evaluate systems engineering techniques and newly developed
technologies. Although close university-industry-government ties for cooperative research
is not new to Stanford, applications research in an operations environment is. Providing a
"real" systems engineering educational experience for students within the Shuttle program
is also new to the School of Engineering at Stanford. The cooperative agreement between
KSC and Stanford was also the first of its kind at KSC. This agreement allows KSC and
Stanford to jointly share personnel and facilities and also closely coordinate and manage
the joint project. The agreement also allows industrial partners of Stanford to participate on
a cost sharing basis on the rapid prototyping efforts. This feature of the program allows the
placement of state-of-the-art prototype equipment (loaned, gifted or heavily discounted to
Stanford) in the middle of NASA operations without violating or jeopardizing future
competitive procurements to acquire the operational system.
With the participants in place, the tile automation project was ready to begin. It is
important to realize that all Shuttle tile processing operations or potential operations come
management and review of the Shuttle TPS engineering review boards. To
the
under
initiate the tile automation project, Stanford and LSOC submitted a project plan to the
engineering review board. With review board approval, funds were allocated from the
Shuttle operations budget to prototype, test, evaluate and finally specify the functional
configuration for the operational system. The project plan laid out a 15 month scheduled
for completion of the prototype evaluation and for functional specifications to be docu
mented. A follow-on period of nine months was allocated for the competitive procurement
and, in parallel, to develop training models and simulation capabilities for the operational
systemi.
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The first step in the engineering process was to establish a general architectural
framework in which all of the operational concepts and technical elements could be
evaluated. One of the more important architectural decisions made in the initial phase of
the program was the selection of an Ada software environment. Although NASA had
already made the decision on Ada for the space station core software environment, no one
had attempted to put Ada into an operational Shuttle program. With a crash training program
in Ada at Stanford, the prototyping team developed the programming skills quickly. The
efforts were aided by the recruitment of a software company (CRI) which provided a
relational database system which was programmed in Ada and easily ported to a number
of different computers including DEC and IBM. Our experience on the project has shown
that Ada provides a good software environment for quality and quantity of code while
remaining hardware independent.
Another important architectural decision was the implementation of a distributed
network configuration. This is a concept where nodes on a network each serve a specific
function. This is opposite to the "mainframe" concept where a large mainframe carries out
a number of functions in a centralized location. The distributed concept takes advantage
of the decreasing cost of specialized hardware for unique functions. This allows for high
performance, good access from anywhere on the network, and a graceful, both in terms of
budget and functionality, evolution as technology evolves. The distributed network concept
also allows forthe tailoring of workstations to meet the unique needs of classes of operations
personnel. The workstations can be developed in a modular manner which can respond
to the particular functions of each job. This makes the task of creating training/simulation
system much easier.
The two architectural decisions above allowed the team to progress rapidly. Our
success became very visible which, in turn, lead to NASA management requesting that we
modify our objectives and schedules. The opportunity was presented to the team to join the
operational personnel to assist in processing the orbiter, Discovery. This is quite a
challenge for a research/prototyping team. Questions arose as to whether we could get the
prototypes certified for use, whether we could meet such condensed schedules, and
whether this would drastically interfere with our initially assigned responsibilities. We chose
to accept the challenge. We first assessed which of the prototype elements would best aid
the work flow for Discovery. It was determined that the speech recognition system and the
relational database were the only ones that could make an impact. Through hard work and
dedication from the entire team, the systems were delivered to the tile processing personnel
working on Discovery. To our surprise, we found minimal acceptance of our labor saving
tools. This was later determined to be due to the fact that none of the work force had an
opportunity to get hands-on experience with the tools and, therefore, had no confidence in
its use undertime critical constraints. With that lesson learned, we have now scheduled
blocks of time in the process to acquaint the tile processing personnel with the prototype
system in a hands-on manner before any the system is put into operational service.
Although the excursion into the operational world delayed our original schedule, the
information gained from the effort has convinced the team that this should be part of the
systems engineering methodology for upgrading operational systems. To do it
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successfully, rigorous detailed scheduling is essential and appropriate allocation of
resources (time and personnel) should be provided.
Although rigorous use of quantitative (probabilistic) risk assessment was not
employed in the SIORA program to date, its importance in providing systems engineering
personnel with a quantitative means of establishing schedules and resource allocations is
readily apparent. Follow-on activities have now incorporated probabilistic risk assessment
as a baseline tool to be employed in the dynamic engineering process.
VII. Conclusion
The systems engineering methodology, concurrent engineering, for the develop
ment of a long term, inexpensive, and efficient space operations capability has been
described. The methodology asks us to consider a cultural change in the way we define,
specify, manage and satisfy system requirements. It also asks us to change the way we
have historically viewed design goals. We must evolve from having solely hardware goals
to where the goals reflect the efficient and productive operations and utilization of the
system. We must also begin to understand the design ramifications of doing full life cycle
cost modeling which includes the operational phase of projects. This concept must be
reflected in the way the government does system procurements. Unlike the linear
engineering approach, the concurrent engineering process forces the user-technologydesign engineering team to continuously iterate throughout the full life cycle of a project.
Throughout the life cycle of a project it is important to maintain an iterative
engineering process to be able to incorporate dynamically changing requirements and
technology. The process is driven by information derived from risk assessment analysis
and rapid prototyping testbeds which are carried out by technology-user-design engineer
ing teams. These teams should have equal representation from the university, industry, and
government sectors and each sector must give proper consideration to the long-term
coordinated support for the training and education of the next generation of engineers and
scientists that will lead the concurrent engineering process for future projects.
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